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From Judicial Election to Merit Selection:

A Time for Change in Illinois
NANCY FORD*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Several issues concerning judicial reform captured the attention
of the convention delegates, the media and the public during the 1969
Illinois Constitutional Convention. Most prominent was the question
of whether judges should continue to be elected or instead should be
appointed by the Governor after being nominated by a judicial
nominating commission. Unable to resolve the issue, convention
delegates decided to let the voters of the state choose between the two
major alternatives. Temporary resolution of the dispute came in the
special election on the proposed Illinois Constitution of December 15,
1970, where 50.207o of the voters supported a revised election system
over a system of judicial appointments.' The question was not,
however, put to rest.
The debate over the method of selecting judges 'emains one of
the most controversial issues in Illinois government. Merit selection
plans have been unsuccessfully introduced as bills or joint resolutions
in almost every session of the General Assembly since 1971.2 Other
bills would have changed the current method of selection to one of
non-partisan nomination of judges followed by their election.' Many
of the bills would have led to a proposed constitutional amendment
to be voted upon in a referendum by the general public.
Both proponents and opponents of a proposed appointive system
are mobilizing for an anticipated legislative fight this year. A revi*

Director, Center for Legal Studies, Sangamon State University; B.A.,

Indiana University; J.D., Temple University.
1. R. COHN, To JUDGE WITH JUSTICE: HISTORY AND POLITICS OF ILLINOIS
JUDICIAL REFORM 141 (1973).
2. See, e.g., H.B. 3269, 83rd Il1. Gen. Assembly, 2d Reg. Sess. (1984); H.B.
2630, 81st Il. Gen. Assembly, 1st Reg. Sess. (1979); H.B. 2143, 79th II. Gen.
Assembly, 1st Reg. Sess. (1975); S.B. 1441, 77th I1. Gen. Assembly, 2d Reg. Sess.
(1972).
3. See, e.g., H.B. 3761, 77th 11. Gen. Assembly, 2d Reg. Sess. (1972).
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sionist coalition of civic, legal, academic, business persons and public
officials was formed, calling itself "Project Merit Selection of Judges."
Sixty-seven chief executive officers of companies in Illinois have
written a letter to state legislators urging the approval of merit
selection.4 The Illinois State Bar Association developed its own ap-

pointment proposal.' A special task force was created by the Governor, with representation from the Illinois Supreme Court, the Illinois
Bar Association, Chicago Bar Association, Chicago Council of Lawyers, the General Assembly, Mothers Against Drunken Driving, the
Illinois Manufacturers Association, and Arthur Young and Company.
It came up with a new proposal for merit selection at the end of last
year which it believes will merge the differing proponent views. 6 On
the other side are the Cook County Bar Association, a group comprised of nearly 700 black attorneys, 7 numerous Cook County Democratic regulars and downstate Republicans, and several influential
elected officials who have not as yet found a merit system they can
endorse. 8 If proponents fail to secure the approval of three-fifths
majorities in both chambers of the General Assembly, it is logical to
expect they will carry on the battle at a 1989-90 Constitutional
Convention, should one be held. 9 One commentator has even suggested that a constitutional convention be called for the sole purpose
of changing the method of judicial election.' 0

4. Group Begins Big Push for Merit Selection, Chi. Daily L. Bull., Feb. 10,
1987, at 14, col. 4.
5. ISBA Approves New Merit Selection Plan, Chi. Daily L. Bull., June 22,
1987, at 1.
6. Task Force Urges Amendment to Let Governor Pick Judges, STATE J.

REG.,

Dec. 5, 1987, at 9.

7. Women's Bar Group Hears Merit Selection Arguments, Chi. Daily L. Bull.,
Feb. 19, 1986, at 1.
8. Kenney, Constitutional Politics: Writing the Executive, Legislative and
JudicialArticle, ILLINOIS POLITICAL PROCESS AND GOVERNMENTAL PERFORMANCE 5455 (E. Crane ed. 1980). See also supra note 6.
9. See supra note 6. In order for a proposal to become part of the Constitution,
the proposal would need a three-fifths affirmative vote in each chamber of the
legislature, as well as ratification by either three-fifths of the voters voting on the
questions or a majority of all of those voting in the next general election (November,
1988). ILL. CONST. art. 14, § 2. Under article 14, § 1(b) of the Constitution of 1970,
the question of whether to call a constitutional convention must be sent to the voters
at least every twenty years. Since the last such question, resulting in the present
constitution was submitted to the voters in 1968, the referendum on this issue must
be put to the voters in November, 1988. If the voters support it, a constitutional

convention will be held.

ILL. CONST.

art. 14, § l(b).

10. A Con-Con For Merit Selection, Chi. Law. Dec., 1987, at 16.
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This article reviews the historical development of the judicial
election system in Illinois, traces events since the adoption of the 1970
Constitution, and reviews current proposals for change. The major
arguments given in support of continuation of partisan judicial election are analyzed. Illinois' judicial retention process is discussed in
relationship to both elective and appointive selection systems. The
author concludes that a representative merit selection method would
be better than Illinois' current election method.
II.

JUDICIAL SELECTION BEFORE THE

1970

CONSTITUTION

From the time Illinois became a state in 1818 until a new judiciary
article to the Illinois Constitution went into effect on January 1, 1964,
the judicial system operated in what had been called "[h]aphazard
order or marginal chaos."" The Constitution of 1818 had established
only a supreme court and delegated authority to the legislature to
create lower courts. The 1848 Constitution set up circuit courts, county
courts and justice of the peace courts in addition to the supreme
court. The General Assembly was left with authority to establish
courts of uniform jurisdiction in cities.' 2 In 1870 a new constitution
continued expansion of the courts. In addition to existing courts, it
provided for the creation of an appellate court, police magistrates,
and the superior and criminal courts of Cook County. The General
Assembly was also empowered to set up probate, city and town
courts. 3 Eventual dissatisfaction with the justice of the peace and
police magistrate courts led to an amendment of the judicial article
of the constitution in 1904 to limit their jurisdiction in Cook County
to areas outside of Chicago.' 4 But a complex judicial department with
a myriad of trial courts still remained.
Under the 1818 Constitution, all judges were appointed by, and
could be removed by, the General Assembly. Because of the control
the General Assembly could exert, all the judges, even the supreme
court judges, lacked any real independence. This judicial inadequacy
was a major cause for drafting the 1848 Constitution. 5 Since the

11. R.

COHN, supra note 1, at 3.
12. Id. at 3-4.
13. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE ILL. CTS., 1971 ANNUAL REPORT TO THE SUPREME
COURT OF ILLINOIS 8 (1971) [hereinafter SUPREME COURT ANNUAL REPORT, 1971].
14. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE ILL. CTS., A SHORT HISTORY OF THE ILLINOIS JUDICIAL
SYSTEMS 16 (1976) [hereinafter ILLINOIS JUDICIAL SYSTEMS].

15. Id. at 8-10.
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adoption of the 1848 Constitution, judges were 6elected, and until
recently re-elected, in partisan contested elections.'
By 1950, the judicial article of the 1870 Constitution, as amended
in 1904, was no longer workable. The multiplicity of courts which
had served Illinois' primarily rural population had become unmanageable with industrialization and the growth of Illinois cities. 17 Attempts were made to amend the judicial article beginning in 1951.
The Illinois State and Chicago Bar Associations created a "Joint
Committee on the Judicial Article" to spear-head the drive. The
committee consisted of practicing lawyers, judges and legal educators.
It produced a draft of the article in 1952, which was then introduced
and considered in assembly sessions in 1953, 1955, 1957 and 1961.'s
A new method of judicial selection was an essential element of
the proposal. Proponents supported what has been referred to as a
"merit plan of selection and tenure."' 9 Its principal features were:
(1) the nomination of a slate of candidates by non-partisan
commissions having both lawyers (or judicial or a combination
of lawyer-judicial members) and public (nonlawyer) members;
(2) appointment by the governor from the nominee list submitted by the commission, and (3) an initial, short probationary term of judicial service by the appointee followed by a
nonadversary elections upon the expiration of his term of
20
office.
By 1957, it appeared that there was sufficient public and professional demand for reform that it could no longer be ignored. Propo16. R. COHN, supra note 1, at 15. One exception was the appellate court. Under
the 1870 Constitution, appellate court judges were appointed by the supreme court
from among the circuit courts and the Superior Court of Cook County. ILLINOIS
JUDICIAL SYSTEMS, supra note 14, at 13-15.
17. SUPREME COURT ANNUAL REPORT,

1971, supra note 13. As early as 1859,

special courts were established to meet the needs of growing cities. They shared
jurisdiction with existing courts. In Cook County, for instance, by 1962, there were
208 courts. They included the circuit court, the superior court, the family court,
criminal court, probate court, county court, the municipal court of Chicago, 23 city,
village, town and municipal courts, 75 justice of the peace courts, and 103 police
magistrate courts. To complicate the problem, there was no administrative authority
to unify, coordinate and supervise them. ILLINOIS JUDICIAL SYSTEMS, supra note 14,
at 19.
18. R. COHN, supra note 1, at 10.
19. Id. at 17.
20. Id. This plan is generally known as the "Missouri Plan," because that state
was the first to adopt all of its elements in its Constitution in 1940. It is also known
as the American Bar Association Plan and the Non-partisan Commission Plan. Id.
at 17 n.1.
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nents of reform, however, were dealt a couple of serious set-backs.
First they were forced into a compromise agreement with a coalition
of political leaders. In order to get the General Assembly to accept
the structural and organizational court reforms that they advocated,
the proponents had to agree to preserve the political adversary system
of electing judges. Even with these concessions, the legislatively
adopted reforms were narrowly defeated in a 1958 statewide referendum.
It was not until the early 1960's that enough support for change
could be mobilized. An expanded Joint Committee on the Judicial
Article of the Illinois State and Chicago Bar Associations led the way.
Committees of the General Assembly were formed to provide broader
professional representation on the question. Proponents and opponents of reform wooed influential organizations. "Policy disputes
between the political forces and bar association leadership were frequent and bitter. The public was bombarded with the pros and cons
of the issues, and press coverage of all forms helped crystallize public
attitudes ..."I' and stir public interest, leading to public acceptance
of the amendment presented to them for ratification in 1962.22
The 1964 Judicial Article transformed a complex judicial system
into a simple and efficient court organization. It created an up-todate, unified court structure which at the time was praised as the
most modern system in the country. 23 Central features included the
following: (1) a three-tiered court structure, with a supreme, appellate,
and circuit courts that could not be added to or deducted from by
the General Assembly;2 4 (2) centralized administrative authority in the
supreme court; 25 (3) a proscription on mandatory appellate jurisdiction
from the appellate court to the supreme court, except where the
appellate court filed a certificate of importance or where a constitutional question of first impression arose, and from the circuit courts
directly to the supreme court in only three circumstances;2 6 (4) appeal
as a matter of right to the appellate court in all cases which could
not be appealed directly to the supreme court;27 (5) circuit courts with
unlimited original jurisdiction of all justiciable matters, with circuit
and associate judges and magistrates, and under the administrative
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.

R. COHN, supra note 1, at 11.
Id.

SUPREME COURT ANN UAL REPORT, 1971, supra note 13.
ILL. CONST. OF 1870 art. VI, § 1 (1962).
ILL. CONST. OF 1870 art. VI, § 2 (1962).
ILL. CONST. OF 1870 art. VI, § 5 (1962).
ILL. CONST. OF 1870 art. VI, § 7 (1962).
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direction of a chief judge accountable to the supreme court; 28 (6) the
creation of an Illinois Courts Commission with authority to suspend
without pay or remove judges from office for cause; 29 and (7) provisions making each judge a state officer with a salary paid by the
state ° and requiring that all judges be licensed attorneys at law.3
A criticism of the 1964 Judicial Article amendment was that it
perpetuated the adversary elective process for the selection of supreme,
appellate and circuit judges. As in 1957, when proponents had been
forced to yield on their merit plan for judicial selection, a new
compromise had to be struck in 1961 to get the proposition out of
the General Assembly and to the voters. The bar reluctantly agreed
to accept continued judicial election; and, in return, the political
parties agreed to accept an appointment system for associate circuit
judges and the third aspect of the merit selection structure-incumbent
judges would be required to seek retention in nonadversarial elections
and obtain a fifty percent or more "yes" vote on the retention
32
question to remain in office.
Attempts in 1965 and 1967 by the organized bar to secure
approval of its merit plan of selection by the General Assembly also
proved fruitless. The 1965 proposal was introduced with the sponsorship of a dozen or so legislators as House Bill 1302. It was referred
to committee where it ended up being tabled a couple of months
later. The 1967 measure received the consideration of the House
Committee on Judiciary, but it was soundly defeated when put to a
33
vote in Committee.

II.
A.

THE FIGHT GOES ON

THE 1970 CONSTITUTION

When the Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention got underway
in December of 1969, protagonists on both sides of the judicial
selection issue were prepared for a fight. In fact, individuals running
as convention delegates, particularly in Cook County, had been
interrogated about their views on the selection of judges by the various
issue oriented organizations before organizational support was given.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

1870 art. VI, § 8-9 (1962).
CONST. OF 1870 art. VI, § 18 (1962).
CONST. OF 1870 art. VI, § 17 (1962).
CONST. OF 1870 art. VI, § 15 (1962).
R. COHN, supra note 1, at 20.
ILL.
ILL.
ILL.
ILL.

CONST. OF

33. Id. at 21-22.
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Cook County Democratic regulars had backed those who indicated
clear support for the existing adversary elective method.14 Meanwhile,
a joint committee of the Illinois State and Chicago Bar Associations,
created in reaction to press and public criticism of the judiciary
resulting from a couple of instances of judicial impropriety, ended up
submitting recommendations for revision of the judicial article to the
constitutional convention soon after the convention got under way.
Included was a proposal for adoption of the merit plan of selecting
judges."
The question first formally came before the convention in January, 1970, when Supreme Court Justice Walter Schafer addressed the
eleven member Judiciary Committee, advocating that appellate and
supreme court judges be appointed. 3 6 It continued to be a focal point
of the testimony which was presented by bar association representatives, individual lawyers, representatives of numerous associations and
organizations, deans of six law schools in Illinois, judges and clerks
of the supreme, appellate and circuit courts, then Lieutenant Governor
Paul Simon, members of House committees, officers of the American
37
Judicature Society, and others until early into April of that year.
The Judiciary Committee, charged with the responsibility of
making recommendations to the convention on the judicial article,
appeared on its face to favor the election of judges position. It was
comprised of four Cook County organizational Democrats; three
downstate Republicans, two of whom appeared to favor election over
appointment; one Chicago Republican who campaigned, while running for a delegate slot, in support of the elective method; two
independent Democrats; and one Republican downstater, appointed
as Chairman, who indicated support-for the merit plan.3" It, therefore,
came as a surprise when the Committee, by a vote of 6 to 5, put
forth a proposal that supreme and appellate court judges be appointed, circuit court judges be elected, and the question of whether
to appoint circuit judges be submitted separately to the voters in
referendum balloting on the draft constitution.3 9
On the first reading before the convention, the Judiciary Committee's majority proposal was vigorously attacked. It was subjected
to several attempts to weaken or displace it by way of amendment,
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id. at 26.

Id. at 29-30.
Kenney, supra note 8, at 37.
R. COHN, supra note 1, at 65-67. See also Kenney, supra note 8, at 37.
R. COHN, supra note 1, at 34-35.
Id.at 71.
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but when the debate was all over, the Committee proposal survived
4
by a vote of 62 to 33. 0
By the time of the second reading, judicial article loyalties had
shifted. Minor changes were made in other provisions of the judicial
article, and then the selection issue came to the fore. A series of
amendments were introduced that called 1) for the election method
to be substituted in the proposed constitution for the merit method
at all levels, and 2) for appointment at all levels to be submitted as a
separate item. They were debated and approved 58-49.
Chicago regular and downstate Democrats and the more conservative Republicans made up the winning side. It was clearly
a triumph for the status quo. Fourteen downstate Republicans
came over to favor election status quo. Fourteen downstate
Republicans came over to favor election of judges on this
vote, from the opposite [sic] position on first reading. .. .
Although the merit plan ended up in the less favored position
under this arrangement, its proponents temporarily accepted defeat.
The final second reading vote on the Judicial Article, with the election
of judges included in the draft and appointment a separate item, was

103 to 3.42

Third reading began on August 27, 1970. Convention rules
required a suspension of the rules by a simple majority of 59 votes in
order for changes to be introduced. Delegates spent two days jockeying for favorable treatment of the alternatives of single-member
and cumulative voting in the legislative article. A trade involving
cumulative voting, banking, and judicial selection questions was being
hammered out. Finally on the 'third day, a motion was made to
suspend the rules so that both the cumulative voting versus single
member districts issue and the judicial election versus judicial appointment issue could be separately submitted to the voters. In each case,
if the proposition received a majority of the vote in the referendum,
it would become a part of the constitution. A long, tedious debate
followed. The motion ultimately prevailed in a roll call vote of 70 to
39.43 The following day (August 30), the judicial article, as amended,

40.

SIXTH ILLINOIS CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF

1970,

RECORD OF PROCEED-

[hereinafter RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS] Vol. I; Kenney, supra note 8, at 39-42;
R. COHN, supra note 1, at 93-101.
41. Kenney, supra note 8, at 42.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 47-50.
INGS
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was approved by convention delegates."4 The fight over Proposition
2-A, the adversary elective process, and Proposition 2-B, the merit
appointment process, moved to the public arena.
A bitter campaign followed. Mayor Richard J. Daley and the
Cook County Democratic organization vigorously supported 2-A.
Wayne Whalen, an independent Democrat from the 35th Senatorial
District who had served on the convention Judiciary Committee,
undertook leadership of the 2-B effort. With limited personnel, time,
funds and space, he was able to wage a remarkable campaign in Cook
County. In the downstate counties there was only a semblance of an
organized effort. On the 2-B side, the Committee for Merit Selection
and the Republican Party in Cook County and the League of Women
Voters statewide played a key role. Also impressive was the almost
unanimous editorial support by the statewide press for the merit
45
plan.
When it was all over, 2-A won by a statewide vote of 1,013,559
to 867,230. The merit plan failed by a margin of less than 150,000
votes. As it broke down, however, Cook County, five collar counties-DeKalb, DuPage, Kane, Lake and McHenry-and the downstate
county of McLean had supported judicial appointment. Downstate
Illinois carried the judicial elective process. 46
Proposition 2-A did make one significant change in the election
process. The 1964 Judicial Article called for the nomination of all
judges by "party convention or primary:" ' 47 The legislature, by statute,48
had provided for nomination by the party convention method only.
But, "[c]onvention nominations too frequently degenerated into political travesties in which convention delegates, handpicked by political
leaders and bound by party discipline, simply rubberstamped their
leader's choice for judge. ' '4 9 With the adoption of the 1970 Constitution, the party primary replaced the party convention as the principal vehicle through which judges are nominated for the general
election. It was left to the General Assembly to determine whether
the primaries and elections would be partisan or non-partisan. The

44. RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS, supra note 40, Vol. I at 6 & 7.
45. R. COHN, supra note 1, at 141 and Kenney, supra note 8, at 54-55.

46. Watson, Analysis of the Vote at the Election for the 1970 Illinois Constitution, ILLINOIS GOVERNMENT 2-3 (Feb., 1971).
47. ILL. CONST. of 1870 art. VI, § 10 (1964).
48. ILL.

REV. STAT.

ch. 46, para. 9-1 to 9-6 (1971).

49. Cohn, The Illinois JudicialDepartment-ChangesEffected by Constitution

of 1970, 1971 U. ILL. L. F. 355, 394 (1971).

674
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Constitution also opened up one other means for candidate names to
appear on the general election ballot-by petition. 0

The associate judges continued to be appointed by the circuit
judges. The supreme court retained authority to set up the process

for associate judge selection. Rather than serving at the pleasure of
the circuit judges, associate judges were given four year terms. Mag-

istrate positions were abolished."

With regard to supreme, appellate and circuit court judges, the
1970 Constitution continued the nonadversary, non-partisan retention
elections of incumbent judges. An amendment increased from fifty
to sixty percent the required affirmative vote of electors that an
incumbent judge must obtain to remain in office. 2
In theory, the 1970 judicial selection changes were designed to

weaken the role of political party leaders in the selection process. In
practice, they were less effective than their supporters envisioned.
B.

SUBSEQUENT LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS

Proponents of merit selection wasted no time after the referendum
election and the adoption of the 1970 Constitution in bringing the

issue before the General Assembly. Two different avenues were pur-

sued. Because incorporating Proposition 2-A into the Constitution
left the method of filling vacancies to the discretion of the legislature
(or the supreme court in the absence of legislation on the question),
judicial vacancy merit selection plans were introduced in the 77th
General Assembly and in each session of the General Assembly since
then, except the 78th and 85th.5 3 Merit selection proposals were also
50. ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 12(a). Section 12(a) reads as follows:
Supreme, Appellate and Circuit Judges shall be nominated at primary
elections or by petition. Judges shall be elected at general or judicial elections
as the General Assembly shall provide by law. A person eligible for the
office of Judge may cause his name to appear on the ballot as a candidate
for Judge at the primary and at the general or judicial elections by submitting
petitions. The General Assembly shall prescribe by law the requirements for
petitions.
51. ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 8.
52. ILL. CONST. art. VI, § 12(d). The change came about because of concern
among many lawyers that the 50% requirement made it impossible to remove an
incompetent judge. Cohn, supra note 49, at 401.
53. See, e.g., H.B.2901, 77th III. Gen. Assembly, 2nd Reg. Sess. (1972);
H.B.3279, 79th Ill. Gen. Assembly, 2nd Reg. Sess. (1976); H.B.1780, 8th Ill. Gen.
Assembly, 1st Reg. Sess. (1977); H.B.2630, 81st Ill. Gen. Assembly, 1st Reg. Sess.
(1979); H.B.1442, 82nd Ill. Gen. Assembly, 1st Reg. Sess. (1981); S.B.1810, 83rd Ill.
Gen. Assembly, 2nd Reg. Sess. (1984); H.B.1770, 84th Ill. Gen. Assembly, 1st Reg.
Sess. (1985).
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introduced that would have led to a constitutional amendment of the
judicial trticle and a referendum by the general public. 4 Other
legislators pushed a third avenue of reform which involved changing
the election method from a partisan to a non-partisan one."
A large number of vacancies occur in the courts each year due
to the death, retirement, appointment or election of judges to higher
courts, or judges' desires simply to leave the bench for one reason or
another. The positions then need to be filled until a replacement can
be selected at the next election. Proponents of merit selection would
prefer to have these vacancies filled through a merit selection process
rather than by the supreme court. The judicial vacancy selection plans
that they have introduced have taken a variety of forms. An early
one that carried the entire Republican sponsorship of the House
would have created nomination commissions made up of legislators
in their respective circuits and districts. When there was a vacancy at
the supreme, appellate or circuit court level, the appropriate nomination commission would have selected a panel of candidates from
which the governor would have made final appointments.16 A second
model called for the supreme court to fill supreme, appellate and
circuit court vacancies from a list of individuals nominated by a
lawyer and nonlawyer nominating commission. The lawyer members
were to have been elected by bar association members from their
respective court districts and circuits. Nonlawyer members would have
been appointed by the governor.5 7 Another variation called for the
governor to make judicial appointments from a list of candidates
submitted by nominating commissions of lawyers and nonlawyers
appointed by the governor in the various court districts and circuits.5 8
Resolutions to amend the judicial article of the constitution have
been even more varied than the vacancy merit selection proposals. Six
different versions have often been pending at any one time. In the
first session of the 85th General Assembly, for example, Represena54. See, e.g., S.J. Res. 37, 80th I11.Gen. Assembly, 1st Reg. Sess. (1977); H.J.
Res. 35, 80th Il. Gen. Assembly, 1st Reg. Sess. (1977); H.J. Res. 20, 85th Ill. Gen.
Assembly, 1st Reg. Sess. (1987); S.J. Res. 7, 85th Ill. Gen. Assembly, 1st Reg. Sess.
(1987).
55. See, e.g., H.B.3761, 77th Ill. Gen. Assembly, 1st Reg. Sess. (1971) and
H.B.2267, 80th Ill. Gen. Assembly, 1st Reg. Sess. (1977).
56. H.B.4349, 77th Ill. Gen. Assembly, 2nd Reg. Sess. (1972).
57. See, e.g., H.B.3279, 79th Ill. Gen. Assembly, 2nd Reg. Sess. (1976);
H.B.2630, 81st Ill. Gen. Assembly, 1st Reg. Sess. (1979); H.B.3269, 83rd Ill. Gen.
Assembly, 2nd Reg. Sess. (1984).
58. See, e.g., H.B.1267, 81st Ill. Gen. Assembly, 1st Reg. Sess. (1979); H.B.1442,
82nd Ill. Gen. Assembly, 1st Reg. Sess. (1981).
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tives Dunn, Netsch, Kelly, Ronan, Farley and Cullerton introduced
merit plans. (The plans have been identified in reference to their lead
sponsor.) 9 A seventh proposal developed as the product of the Task
Force on Judicial Merit Selection, which was created by the governor
last year, will be introduced when the General Assembly reconvenes
for the second session. °
The Task Force, Dunn and Netsch proposals call for the governor
to appoint Illinois' judges. 61 Under the Kelly and Cullerton plans the
supreme court would be the appointing authority. 62 Ronan would
have the governor make the appointments of circuit judges with the
consent of the Senate. 63 Farley would have the Director of the
Administrative Office of the Illinois Courts randomly select appellate
and circuit judges from lists of nominees supplied by a nominating
commission, with the names selected needing approval by the supreme
court justices from the appropriate judicial districts. 64
The Task Force, Dunn and Kelly plans would pertain to all
judges throughout the state. 65 The Cullerton bill calls only for the
appointment of appellate and circuit judges, with supreme court
judges continuing to be elected. 66 Netsch, Ronan and Farley provide
for local options. Netsch would require appointment of supreme and
appellate judges, but appointment of circuit and associate judges only
59. H.J. Res. 20, 85th Ill. Gen. Assembly, 1st Reg. Sess. (1989); H.J. Res. 3,
85th Ill. Gen. Assembly, 1st Reg. Sess. (1987); S.J. Res. 4, 85th Ill. Gen. Assembly,
1st Reg. Sess. (1987); H.J. Res. 5, 85th Ill. Gen. Assembly, 1st Reg. Sess. (1987);
H.J. Res. 16, 85th Ill. Gen. Assembly, 1st Reg. Sess. (1987); H.J. Res. 18, 85th I11.
Gen. Assembly, 1st Reg. Sess. (1987).
60. See supra note 6. Both Richard L. Theis, President of the Illinois Bar
Association, and the Chicago Tribune in a recent editorial, have endorsed adoption
of the federal court model for Illinois. Under such a system, the governor would
appoint the judges at all levels subject to confirmation by the legislature (probably
the Senate). Judges would have life-time tenure. Thus far, this model has not made
its way into the General Assembly. Bar President:Appoint Illinois Judgesfor Life,

Chicago Tribune, Nov. 23, 1986, § 1, at 5, col. 1.
61. Task Force on Judicial Merit Selection, Proposed Constitutional Amendment of article VI, § 12.1(a) (Adopted Dec. 3, 1987); H.J. Res. 20, supra note 59,
at § 11.1(a); S.J. Res. 7, supra note 59, at § 12.1(b).
62. S.J. Res. 14, supra note 59, at § 8 & 12; H.J. Res. 18, supra note 59, at §
12(a).

63. H.J. Res. 5, supra note 59, at § 12.1(b).
64. H.J. Res. 16, supra note 59, at § 12.1.
65. Task Force on Judicial Merit Selection, Proposed Constitutional Amendment of article VI, § 12.1(a) (Adopted Dec. 3, 1987); H.J. Res. 20, supra note 59,
at § 11.l(a); S.J. Res. 14, supra note 59, at § 8 & 12.
66. H.J. Res. 18, supra note 59, at §§ 12(a), (d).
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in circuits that choose to adopt the appointment method by referendum of the voters. 67 Farley specifies that all appellate, circuit and
associate judges within a judicial district that adopts the plan by
district-wide referendum of the voters would be appointed. Supreme
court judges would continue to be elected. 68 Both Netsch and Farley
allow for terminating the appointment of lower court judges after
eight years via referendum. 69 Ronan sets up a complicated system
whereby all circuit judges would be appointed unless a local option
referendum indicated that voters do not support the plan. After five
years, the General Assembly would be empowered to review the
appointment method and abolish it as to the circuits or extend it to
appellate judges. After five more years, the General Assembly could,
by legislation, provide for the appointment of supreme court judges
as well.

70

Each plan, except the Kelly plan, calls for the appointing authority to make the appointment from a list submitted by a nominating
group. The Task Force, Dunn, Netsch, Ronan and Farley proposals
would have the judges selected from a list of three nominees generated
by applicable circuit or district nominating commissions. 7 ' Cullerton's
nominee list would be developed entirely by judges. Appellate nominees would be recommended by the appellate judges of the district
where the vacancy occurs. Circuit judge nominees would be submitted
to the supreme court by a nominating committee consisting of the
72
Chief Judge and at least two, but no more than ten, circuit judges.
Under Kelly's plan, no formal mechanism for generating nominees to
the supreme court for the appellate or circuit court positions is
specified. The plan does call for the supreme court to consider
recommendations from Illinois bar associations and other appropriate
organizations .71
Of the plans that include judicial nominating commissions, the
make-up of the commissions vary somewhat. Dunn and Netsch provide for 11 member commissions-six laypersons and five lawyers.
67. S.J. Res. 7, supra note 59, at § 12.2.
68. H.J. Res. 16, supra note 59, at § 12.
69. S.J. Res. 7, supra note 50, at § 12.2(b); H.J. Res. 16, supra note 59, at §
12.2(b).
70. S.J. Res 5, supra note 59, at §§ 12.2 & 12.6.
71. Task Force On Judicial Merit Selection, Proposed Constitutional Amendment to article VI, §§ 12.1(c)-(e) (Adopted Dec. 3, 1987); H.J. Res. 20, supra note
59, at §§ 11.l(a), 11.2; S.J. Res. 7, supra note 59, at § 12.3; H.J. Res. 5, supra note
60, at § 12.3; H.J. Res. 16, supra note 59, at § 12.3.
72. H.J. Res. 18, supra note 59, at § 12(d).
73. S.J. Res. 14, supra note 59, at §§ 8, 12.

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 8

Three laypersons would be named by the Attorney General and three
by the next highest ranking elected constitutional officer of the State
(Secretary of State, Comptroller, Treasurer, President of the Senate,
Speaker of the House, Minority Leader of the Senate, or the Minority
Leader of the House) who is of a different political party from that
of the Attorney General. The lawyer members would be elected
without party designation by other lawyers who have principal offices
in the district or circuit. 74 Ronan calls for six laypersons, five lawyers,
and a non-voting circuit judge from the applicable circuit to constitute
the nominating commissions. Lay members would be appointed by
the Speaker of the House, the President of the Senate, the Minority
Leader of the Senate, and the two highest constitutional officers of
the two political parties (except the Governor and Lt. Governor).
Lawyer members would be elected without party labels by lawyers
who have a principal office in the circuit. 75 Farley's nominating
commissions would also be made-up of 11 members-six laypersons
and five lawyers. The lawyers would be elected with party designation,
alternating between the parties, by lawyers whose principal office is
in the district or circuit. Two of the laypersons would be appointed
by the governor, each from a different political party; and one each
would be appointed by the four legislative leaders. 76 Under the Task
Force plan, the composition of the commissions would be different
in Cook Country than for the rest of the State. In districts and circuits
with more than three million people, commissions would have 15
members: eight non-lawyers (at least two appointed at large and two
appointed from subdistricts) and seven lawyers (two appointed atlarge and one from a subdistrict). Less populated districts and circuits
would have II member commissions. Half of the non-lawyers would
be appointed by the Attorney General; the other half by the highest
elected state official who is not of the same political party as the
Attorney General. The lawyer members would be selected as provided
77
for by supreme court rule.
Under the Task Force and Dunn plans, the office of associate
judge would be abolished while all present associate judges would
become circuit judges. 78 Netsch and Farley would retain the office of
74. H.J. Res. 20, supra note 59, at §§ 11.2 (b), (c), (d); S.J. Res. 7, supra note
59, at 99 12.3 (b), (c), (d).
75. H.J. Res. 5, supra note 59, at §§ 12.3 (b), (c), (d).
76. H.J. Res. 16, supra note 59, at §§ 12.3(b), (c), (d).
77. Task Force on Judicial Merit Selection, Proposed Constitutional Amendment to article VI, § 12.2 (Adopted Dec. 3, 1987).
78. Id. at § 12.2(g); H.J. Res. 20, supra note 59, at § 11.1(g).
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associate judge, but would have them be selected under the merit
system in those locales exercising their merit selection local option.7 9
Under the Task Force, Dunn and Ronan models, the initial term
of office of all judges would be six years with subsequent terms of
ten years.8 0 Under the Cullerton plan, judges would continue to stand
for retention election at the expiration of each term, as provided in
the 1970 Constitution.8 ' Kelly would have reappointments determined
by the supreme court.12 The Task Force, Dunn, Netsch, Ronan and
Farley proposals would create review commissions to evaluate incumbent judges seeking retention. Under each model, judges recommended by the commissions for retention would be retained without
more. Judges rejected by the commissions would stand for retention
at the next general election. 3
As noted previously, the 1970 Constitution left it to the legislature
to decide whether judicial races would be partisan or non-partisan.
The General Assembly chose the partisan route. Bills for partisan
primaries and elections, with the opportunity for nomination by
petition, were passed by the 77th Illinois General Assembly in November, 1971. They were vetoed by the governor on the ground that
partisan primaries and elections would perpetuate the undesirable
political controls seen in past judicial races. However, the vetoes were
overridden on January 13, 1972, and partisan politics has, as the
84
governor predicted, played a significant role in the election of judges.
Over the years, legislators have introduced proposals to change the
election method from a partisan to a non-partisan system. Under one
bill, all candidates for judge would run against each other in a nonpartisan primary; no party identification would appear on the ballot.
The candidates receiving the two highest numbers of votes would run
85
in the general election, again without a party label.
79. S.J. Res. 7, supra note 59, at § 12.2; H.J. Res. 16, supra note 59, at §
12.1(a).
80. Task Force On Judicial Merit Selection, Proposed Constitutional Amendment to article VI, § 10 (Adopted Dec. 3, 1987); H.J. Res. 20, supra note 59, at §
10; H.J. Res. 5, supra note 59, at § 10.
81. H.J. Res. 18, supra note 59, at § 12(e).
82. S.J. Res. 14, supra note 59, at § 12(c).
83. Task Force on Judicial Merit Selection, Proposed Constitutional Amendment to article VI, § 12.4 (Adopted Dec. 3, 1987); H.J. Res. 20, supra note 59, at §
12.1; S.J. Res. 7, supra note 59, at § 12.5; H.J. Res. 5, supra note 59, at § 12.5;
H.J. Res. 16, supra note 59, at § 12.5.
84. Cohn, supra note 49, at 396 n.162. See also infra text accompanying notes
120-123.
85. H.B. 2267, supra note 55.
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The non-partisan election method has its critics too. They contend
that political parties would still be involved in judicial selection. In
spite of the apparently non-partisan process, their involvement would
merely shift behind the scenes. Further, they argue, "party labels, for
better or worse, are one of the few indicators the public may have of
the judicial philosophy of a candidate." 8 6 Recent studies have verified
that:
[w]here partisan labels are not available, voters must rely upon
other kinds of short-cut guides to voting, such as incumbency,
name familiarity, or ethnic-religious affiliation of the candidate. And where none of these other nonparty cues are meaningful to the individual voter, votes may be cast on the basis
of sex, nickname, or ballot position of the respective candidates, truly arbitrary decision-making tools."
Thus far, all avenues of judicial selection reform have failed. The
General Assembly has steadfastly refused to set up a merit system for
filling vacancies or to put a constitutional amendment on merit
selection up for a popular referendum. Nor has the non-partisan
election reform been able to muster General Assembly approval. The
partisan versus non-partisan issue, however, is no longer central. All
indications are that proponents will not stop until the partisan judicial
election system gives way to some compromise merit selection method,
via either General Assembly/voter referendum approval or constitutional convention/voter referendum approval.
IV.

Is

CHANGE WORTH THE EFFORT?

In the early days of our country's history and up until the mid1800's, all of the states chose judges, either via appointment by the
legislature, or appointment by the governor with the consent of the
legislature or a special council. The executive appointment method is
still used in the federal judiciary and in a small number of states.
Legislative appointment of judges -still occurs in three states. The
appointment method is most often accompanied by life-time tenure
for the judges. This method is based upon the belief that judges
should decide disputes in a reasoned, disinterested fashion according
to law. Judges are seen as objective interpreters of the law who derive
their legitimacy from objectivity and professionalism. The appoint86. Kopecky, Should Judges Be Elected or Appointed.-, 3
(Dec., 1977).
87. P.

DUBOIS,

FROM BALLOT TO BENCH 245

(1980).

ILL. ISSUES

14, 17
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ment procedures used are said to maximize the two goals of competence and indepehdence.88
The appointment method is no longer used by most states,
because it gradually came to be viewed as an elitist political spoils
system where elected public officiils rewarded their loyal party workers. Simultaneous to its demise, the concept of popular election began
to emerge during the Jacksonian era (1820s-1850s) as a part of the
larger push to make government more democratic. As politi.cal parties
grew in strength, judicial elections became partisan. Candidates for
judgeships were nominated by party conventions and they campaigned
along with candidates for other offices.8 9 Today, proponents of popular elections primarily value a judiciary that is responsive to the
wishes of those it serves. They believe judges should be accountable
to the people for the policy choices they make, recognizing that the
states' highest courts often make law in addition to interpreting it.
The electorate is seen as competent to evaluate the qualifications of
judicial office-seekers. Party labels are said to provide the voters with
guidance on the policy orientations of the candidates. 90 Illinois is
among 14 states that employ partisan election as the primary method
of selecting major court judges. 9'
Merit systems for judicial selection, on the other hand, are viewed
as a means of balancing accountability with judicial competence and
independence. Public accountability is said to be preserved 1) by
having nominating commissions composed of professionals and citizens who are carefully selected for their role of evaluating candidate
credentials, and 2) by requiring that judges submit to a retention
election on a periodic basis. Arguably, because judicial candidates do
not have to seek political support from a party, they are not obligated
to bargain away their independence.
88. Wasmann, Lovrich, & Sheldon, Perceptionsof State and Local Courts: A
Comparison Across Selection Systems, 11 JUST. SYS. J. 168, 170 (1986). See also M.
COMISKY & P. PATTERSON, THE JUDICIARY: SELECTION, COMPENSATION, ETHICS AND
DISCIPLINE 5-6 (1987); P. DuBoIs, supra note 87, at 3.
89. P. DuBoIs, supra note 87, at 3.
90. Wasmann, Lovrich, & Sheldon, supra note 88, at 171.
91. M. COMISKY & P. PATTERSON, supra note 88, at 7-8. Fourteen other states
utilize non-partisan election for all or some of their major courts. Id. at 9. Nonpartisan elections were adopted by the turn of the twentieth century because of rising
dissatisfaction with partisan elections. P. DuBols, supra note 87, at 4. Judicial
appointment of judges is rare in this country. It is used most frequently as a method
of selecting members of the minor judiciary and associate, special and substitute
judges. Illinois and Louisiana are the only states in which vacancies are filled in the
major courts by the state's highest court. M. COMISKY & P. PATTERSON, supra note
88, at 6-7.
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Merit selection is the newest of the various selection reforms. It
was developed and promoted in the early 1900s by various segments
of the legal profession unhappy with both partisan and non-partisan
elections. The American Bar Association first endorsed a merit selection plan in 1937.92 At the present time, twenty-four states are subject
to constitutional or statutory merit plans in the selection of all or
some of their appellate and major trial court judges. Eleven other
states have adopted voluntary commission models. 93
It is generally agreed that in selecting judges to the various courts,
mechanisms should be used that attract qualified applicants. Selection
should be based on criteria such as legal ability, experience, impartiality, fairness, temperament and industriousness. Judicial decisionmaking should be shielded from considerations of political partisanship and political ideology to the greatest extent possible. Once
selected, judges should not be terminated for reasons that are not
related to their qualifications and job performance. It is against these
assumptions that the current election method used in Illinois and the
proposed merit method will be analyzed. Attention will be focused
on the extent to which the values of quality, accountability, and
independence are or could be given effect.
A.

QUALITY

Critics of judicial election often assert that electoral politics
prevent many qualified candidates from seeking judicial posts in the
first place.
Successful lawyers are said to be reluctant to set aside their
lucrative law practices to pursue election to the judiciary.
Clients and cases must be set aside temporarily while the
attorney conducts a campaign with no assurances that his or
her practice will be intact if the bid is unsuccessful ...
Qualified attorneys are also said not to seek elective judicial
office because they are unwilling to engage in the electioneering
and campaigning required for a successful bid for office. . . .Additionally, lawyers are reluctant to participate in a
selection process which, in their view, more frequently rewards
individuals skilled in politics than it does those who possess
superior professional qualifications.9"
92. P. DuBoIs, supra note 87, at 4.
93. M. COMISKY & P. PATTERSON, supra note 88, at 10-11.
94. P. DuBoIs, supra note 87, at 6.
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Further, critics argue that the election method allows unqualified
individuals to be selected. As the argument goes, candidates are
selected by voters who generally lack knowledge of the candidate's
qualifications and/or who are relatively indifferent to the outcome of
judicial elections. Voters are tied more to party identity than candidate
credentials. Voters are said not to be competent to evaluate candidates'
qualifications, and therefore professionals need to be more directly
involved. The large number of judicial candidates on the ballot in
some areas is said to confuse the public, making it difficult for them
to choose the most qualified from among the group. Finally, critics
of elections point to the fact that party nominees are generally selected
by political leaders who care more about political expediency than the
comparative merit of the particular candidates. 95
Is there truth to these claims? At present, there is no conclusive
evidence concerning the extent to which the elective method of judicial
selection serves as a deterrent to qualified individuals seeking judgeships. 96 There are anecdotal accounts of lawyers who decided not to
seek judicial posts because of the rigors of campaigning and the
uncertainty of the outcome. Any practicing lawyer knows of the
impossibility of putting cases and clients on hold during a campaign.
Cases have to be shifted to other associates or firms and, once shifted,
clients may or may not return. Also, what about the lawyer's lost
income during the campaign period? Candidates for other offices are
often able to draw a salary while they campaign.
On the other hand, one cannot ignore the realities of partisan
judicial election in Illinois. For years candidates have been slated by
party chieftains. They often run unopposed in the primary, and then,
because of their party label, run without real opposition in the general
election. 97 This process carries with it very little uncertainty for
candidates with appropriate party endorsements.
With regard to the question of whether or not the partisan elective
process puts unqualified candidates on the bench, there is some
available information. It has been shown that some unskilled judges
are currently on the bench in Illinois. For example, a nine-member
Special Commission on the Administration of Justice, set up following
the Greylord scandal in Cook County, concluded that there is a pool
95. Id. at 7; M. COMISKY & P. PATTERSON, supra note 88, at 8; A 'Compromise'
on Merit Selection, Chicago Tribune, Feb. 25, 1987, § 1, at 14, col. 1.

96. P.

DUBOIS,

supra note 87, at 12.

97. Wheeler, What's All This Fuss About Merit Selection?, 13 ILL. ISSUES 4
(Mar., 1987); Let's Select Judges on Their Merit, Not Their Politics, Chicago Tribune,
Jan. 21, 1987, § 1, at 17, col. 2. See also infra text accompanying notes 120-23.
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of judges in the Cook County Criminal Court who are unqualified to
perform their functions. The Commission found that the random
assignment of cases, devised to prevent judge-shopping, was being
circumvented. Only a select group of more skilled judges were being
assigned the more complex or controversial cases. 98 Further, any
lawyer, litigant, or court watcher who regularly observes the courts
can also attest to the incompetence of some judges.
It is also clear that bar association evaluations of judges or
prospective judges do not work well on a consistent basis, since
incompetent or unethical judges end up receiving positive endorsements. Illustrative is the case of Judge Joseph McDermott, a judge
convicted of accepting bribes in Cook County Traffic Court. Prior to
his conviction, he ran for retention in the November, 1986 election as
a choice of the Democratic regulars. He was elected. However, the
bar associations failed to pick up on the fact that Greylord charges
had been lodged against him. In fact, the Chicago Bar Association
rated him "qualified for retention," while the Chicago Council of
Lawyers said that he was "unqualified" because he lacked experience
(not because of concerns about integrity). In spite of the unqualified
rating, the Council determined that he was a "well-regarded practitioner."99
Typically, bar groups delve into all aspects of a candidate,
including their legal abilities, legal knowledge, temperament and
integrity.1oo Volunteer attorneys reach their conclusions after reviewing
candidate questionnaires and reports prepared by investigative teams.
Interviews are held with each applicant. Bar association members are
98. Verdict on Judge: Unskilled, Chicago Tribune, Feb. 12, 1987, § 2, at 2,
col. 3.
The Greylord investigation has been viewed as one of the most comprehensive,
intricate and difficult undercover projects ever undertaken by a law enforcement
agency. Under the supervision of U.S. Attorney Dan Webb, the FBI engaged in a
variety of tactics to undercover corruption in the circuit court of Cook County.
Electronic eavesdropping was conducted in judges' chambers, court cases were
contrived with FBI agents passing as corrupt lawyers, drunken drivers and defendants
giving false statements under oath. The investigation yielded indictments of judges,
lawyers, police officers, deputies and court clerks. As a result of Greylord, thus far,
eight judges have been convicted of wrongdoing and one associate judge has been
acquitted. See Questions on Greylord Still Remain, Chicago Tribune, May 3, 1987,

§ 2, at 1, col. 5.

99. Lawyers Admit Lapse on Rating: McDermott Bribe Charge Ignored, Chi-

cago Tribune, Nov. 21, 1986, § 2, at 1, col. 5.

100. New Judge's Bribery Accusations Escaped Voters, Chicago Tribune, Nov.

16, 1986, § 3, at I, col. 2.
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often surveyed as to the capabilities of the candidates. Some bar
groups rate the candidates and give reasons for their findings. Others
simply make public their ratings. 0 In the McDermott case, evaluators
failed to ask McDermott the right questions and overlooked information that had been supplied to them by the U.S. Attorney.
Even when all goes as planned, there are inherent flaws in the
system. Bar association surveys of members are far from reliable. All
lawyer members in a district or circuit are generally polled. There is
nothing to prevent lawyers who are unfamiliar with a candidate's
performance from completing the survey and returning it anyway, or
to prevent candidates from soliciting the cooperation of lawyer-friends
and associates in filling them out. 0 2
Additionally, the ratings of bar associations are often ignored by
voters. An example can be found in the Cook County Democratic
primary race in the Spring, 1986. Three judicial candidates, who were
endorsed by Mayor Harold Washington, won despite being rated
unqualified by the Chicago Bar Association. 03 This is not too surprising, however, when one considers the fact that the various bar
groups cannot even agree on which judges are qualified and which
are not. In the November, 1986 general election, the Chicago Council
of Lawyers evaluated eight of 38 judges seeking retention as unqualified. The Chicago Bar Association found 24 of the retention judges
highly qualified, including three judges that the Council rated as
unqualified.'0 4
Whether or not more incompetent judges ascend to the bench
because of the elective method than would be found under a merit
101. Two Groups of Lawyers Lash Out at Retention of Five Circuit Judges,

Chicago Tribune, June 25, 1987, § 2, at 2, col. 2; Eight Judges Don't Rate With Bar
Group, Chicago Tribune, Oct. 8, 1986, § 2, at 1, col. 5.
102. This kind of survey is often used by circuit judges in seeking input on
applicants for associate judgeships. The surveys are often no more than popularity
contests. Until recently, the ratings in the Seventh Circuit were released to the press
in spite of the unwarranted damage to the professional reputations of the applicants
that this might have caused. The public was not made aware of the unreliability of
the research methods employed, only of the results. Seventh Circuit Moving Toward
Filling Vacancies for Judges, STATE J. REG., Jan. 22, 1988, at 10.
103. Politicians Not Exactly Friends of the Court as Judges Fight for Retention,

Chicago Tribune, Sept. 14, 1986, § 5, at 4, col. 1. See also Lermack, Illinois Judges:
Too Much Retention and Too Little Selection, 5 ILL. ISSUES, 8-11 (June, 1979). Of
16 downstate judges opposed by the Illinois Bar Association in 1978, 14 were retained.
Of 33 judges rated as unqualified by the Bar Association between 1970 and 1978, 31
were elected. Id.
104. Eight Judges Don't Rate With Bar Group, supra note 101. See, also,
Lawyers Group Disputes Ratings, 9 NAT'L L.J., Oct. 20, 1986, at 9, col. 1.

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 8

method, however, is difficult to assess. One technique used by researchers to answer this question has been to conduct surveys. Watson
and Downing, for instance, surveyed Missouri lawyers regarding the
performance of current circuit and appellate judges. They found that
judges selected under the merit plan were rated as more competent
than judges who originally came to the bench under the election
system used in Missouri prior to 1940.105 On the other hand, the
Yankelovich, Skelly and White Polling Organization surveyed and
conducted nationwide interviews with members of the general public,
community leaders, judges and lawyers to determine how their perceptions of the courts and judges were influenced by the judicial
selection method. They found little evidence that the selection method
used actually affected perceptions of judicial competence. 1°6
Further, the survey approach presents some methodological difficulties. One difficulty is that the evaluation criteria being used by
each respondent is never known. A second difficulty is that a rater's
disposition toward one method over the other can affect survey
reliability. In the Missouri survey, for example, a positive relationship
between the respondents' evaluation of judicial performance and their
support for a particular selection method was shown, thus coloring

the survey results. 107

Aware of these shortcomings, some scholars have tried looking
to more objective measures of judicial quality. They have analyzed
the education and experience of judges, under various selection methods, as indicators of judicial capability. They start out presuming that
merit plans promote the placement of high quality persons to the
bench without particular ties to the local community, and that merit
candidates will have more impressive academic credentials. They also
presume that under the elective method, judges would have more of
a history of experience in elective political positions.
The research has not verified these hypotheses. Herbert Jacob
compared elected and merit trial and appellate court judges in twelve
states in the early 1960s. In terms of education, he found no particular
advantage among merit plan judges over elected judges. Elected judges
105. R. WATSON & R. DOWNING, THE POLITICS OF THE BENCH AND BAR: JUDICIAL
SELECTION UNDER THE MISSOURI NON-PARTISAN COURT PLAN

272-308 (1969). A recent

study of Missouri judges showed little change in the qualifications and backgrounds
of the sitting judges. The only significant difference was that 1986 judges had more
prior judicial experience. Tokarz, Women Judges and Merit Selection Under the
Missouri Plan, 64 WASH. U.L.Q. 935-937 (1986).
106. Wasmann, Lovrich, & Sheldon, supra note 88, at 181-183.
107. P. DUBOlS, supra note 87, at 15.
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were more likely to have held prior political office, but not in areas
that would prepare them for judgeships. More locally born judges
could be found in partisan election states, but judges in merit states
were likely to have attended in-state law schools. 08 Bradley Canon
compared judges sitting on state supreme courts for the years 1961 to
1968. His research showed that there were no differences between the
election and merit plan methods in terms of the educational levels of
the judges or their prior public or judicial experience. Elected judges
were slightly more likely than merit judges to have been born in-state
and to have received their legal educations in-state.' °9
A new study by Henry Glick and Craig Emmert supports these
earlier findings. Glick and Emmert collected data on the characteristics
of state supreme court judges who were serving in 1980-1981. They
found that 1) the merit selection judges were less likely to have been
born in-state or to have attended in-state schools than the elected
judges; 2) the merit and elected judges were comparable in terms of
their educational backgrounds, although a few more merit judges
attended prestigious law schools; 3) merit selection judges were more
likely to have prior government experience; and 4) the judges of the
two systems were similar in terms of their partisan political careers.
Overall, they concluded that differences in localism, education, and
previous experience was due more to regional factors than to the
selection method used." 0
By comparing the characteristics of Illinois' seven elected supreme
court justices on the bench in 1983 to Glick's supreme court merit
selection judges, presumptions concerning local ties and political
experience appear more valid. One hundred percent of Illinois' supreme court justices were born in-state and eighty-six percent attended
Illinois colleges. Only sixty-six percent of Glick's merit judges were
born in-state, and fewer than seventy-one percent attended in-state
colleges and law schools. Sixty-five percent of Illinois' justices had
prior judicial experience, compared to sixty percent of Glick's merit
judges, but fifty-six percent of the Illinois' justices ascended to the

108. Jacob, The Effect of Institutional Differences in the Recruitment Process:
The Case of State Judges, 13 J. PUB. L. 104-114 (1964).
109. Canon, The Impact of Formal Selection Processes on the Characteristics
of Judges-Reconsidered,6 L. & Soc'Y REV. 579-593 (May 1972).
110. Glick & Emmert, Selection Systems and Judicial Characteristics,70 JUDICATURE 229-235 (Dec.-Jan. 1987). Canon had also come to the conclusion that
differences in judges' background characteristics were more the product of regional
factors than the selection system. Canon, supra note 109, at 17.

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 8

bench via the political office/prosecutorial route compared to only
23.5% of Glick's merit selection judges."'
Overall it must be said, however, that empirical comparisons
have been inconclusive. "It is exceedingly difficult if not impossible
• . .to verify or refute the assertion that the merit plan improves the
quality of the bench.""11 2 Determining who are "best qualified" as
judges is a subjective, uncertain and problematic task.
B.

ACCOUNTABILITY

Defenders of popular election rest their case on the notion that
judges, like other policy-makers, must be accountable for their decisions. Elections, it is argued, enable the public to assert control over
the policy-making process by giving voters an opportunity to examine
judges' values and judicial philosophy and to choose judges based on
their liberal or conservative bent. As indirect benefits of the election
method, the court is said to be accorded greater legitimacy and the
interests of minorities and women are said to be given greater prominence." 3
Judicial elections, however, do not hold judges accountable in
the way that was intended. To exercise judgment, the electorate must
be able to identify the kinds of policy decisions a candidate can be
expected to make and have a meaningful choice between opposing
candidates." 4 Judicial election campaigns in Illinois typically do not
involve a discussion of substantive issues of judicial policy by opposing
candidates. Nor should they. It is a violation of legal ethics for
judicial aspirants to discuss their positions on policy issues which have
or are likely to come before them." 5 Although voters should be
informed about a candidate's professional credentials, they seldom
are. In the more populated districts and circuits, voters choose blindly
from a long list of names of individuals they don't know and with
I11. Illinois' calculations are based upon data contained in Daniels, Melton, &
Wilkin, The Illinois Supreme Court: What Role Does It Play?, 10 ILL. ISSUES 11-18
(April 1984).
112. P. DUBOIS, supra note 87, at 17.
113. P. DuBoIS, supra note 87, at 29-30; Merit Selection Discriminates Against
Minorities, Women: Pincham, Chi. Daily L. Bull., Oct. 3, 1986, at 36, col. I.
114. P. DuBoIs, supra note 87, at 32-33.
115. See, e.g., S. Ct. R. 67 B(1)(c), to be codified as ILL. REv. STAT., ch. I1lOA,
para. 67 (1987). This judicial canon provides in relevant part that a candidate for
judicial office should not "announce his views on disputed legal or political issues ....
[H]e may announce his views on measures to improve the law, the legal
system, or the administration of justice, if, in doing so, he does not cast doubt on
his capacity to decide impartially any issue that may come before him."
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whom they have little chance of becoming familiar. They most often
do not even know how to evaluate the candidates aside from looking6
at candidate names, party labels, or candidate position on the ballot."
Evaluation mechanisms used by the various bar associations have not
7
proven to be an effective way of educating the voters."
When the voters' interest does get aroused in a judicial race, it
is most likely to be the result of a negative campaign launched by a
special interest group or newspaper. Sometimes these campaigns do
focus on proper political concerns, such as a judge's liberal or
conservative inclinations. Other times, though, campaigns are launched
against judges who simply attempt to uphold the law in a controversial
case. Illustrative are the races of Charles Iben (10th Circuit, 1978)
and Lawrence Passarella (Cook County Circuit, 1986). The Peoria
Journal Star took on incumbent Iben in a series of four editorials.
This in turn stimulated letters to the editor and caught the attention
of other media. Iben was accused of a variety of things from holding
sloppy informal court sessions to keeping short hours. Although the
focus of the media was primarily on questions of performance, the
truth of the matter was that the newspaper had opposed him because
he had a reputation for being a liberal judge and of setting low bail
for criminal defendants. His values were not in line with the relatively
conservative newspaper or the area within which he worked. He lost
his retention bid after obtaining only 50.8% of the affirmative votes."'
Similarly, Passarella became the target of intense lobbying by police
groups after he acquitted a man accused of beating a Chicago
policewoman. Passarella received a fifty-seven percent approval rating
from the voters and similarly was not retained." 9
Judicial election rarely gives Illinois voters a real choice. From
1974 to 1984, seventy-one percent of circuit judgeships from the City
116. A 'Compromise' on Merit Selection, Chicago Tribune, Feb. 25, 1987, § 1,
at 14, col. 1; Women's Bar Group Hears Merit Selection Arguments, supra note 7;
It's Time for Merit Selection, Chicago Tribune, March 27, 1986, § 1, at 27, col. i.
In the Democratic primary election for Cook County Circuit court vacancies in
March of 1986, two fringe candidates of questionable qualifications were chosen over
higher rated candidates. Something similar happened in 1984 when five virtually
unknown candidates beat out better qualified incumbents. The most plausible explanation offered at the time was that candidates with Irish names defeated candidates
with non-Irish names. Id.
117. See supra text accompanying notes 99-104.
118. Lermack, supra note 103, at 10; ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE ILL. CTS., 1978
ANNUAL REPORT TO THE SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIs

62-63 (1978).

119. Reawakened Voters Rise to Oust Three Judges, Chicago Tribune, Nov. 6,
1986, § 2, at 8, col. 4; Illinois State Bar Association, 17 BENCH AND BAR 3-4 (Dec.
1986).
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of Chicago were filled by candidates who ran unopposed in both the
primary and general elections. 20 When a candidate is opposed in a
primary contest, the candidate slated by party chieftains can expect
to win. In fact, in the six elections prior to 1984, only six Democrats
not slated by the party organization had won the Democratic primary
election.' 21 Only Democratic candidates are generally elected in the
City of Chicago and county-wide. Only Republicans can expect to
win the suburban-wide contests.

122

Downstate the dominant party in each district or circuit also
controls the election. In the 1986 judicial election, out of 48 races, 29
were without opposition from the minority party. Of the five appellate
vacancies in the First District, three Democratic candidates ran without
Republican opposition. In the 4th District appellate races, two Republicans ran for two slots without opposition. In the circuit court
races, 10 of 17 Cook County (city) judgeships were filled by Democratic judges who ran without Republican contenders. Vacancies were
filled in the 2nd, 9th, l1th, 14th, 15th, 16th and 18th circuits by
Republican candidates who had no Democratic opposition. One of
the vacancies in the 4th circuit and one in the 20th circuit went to
unopposed Democratic candidates.

23

Judges seeking retention in Illinois run on their records. Retention
elections are non-partisan and the judges run unopposed. This is an
innovation that usually accompanies merit selection. Of the states
using retention elections, Illinois is the only state that does not have
120. Let's Select Judges on Their Merit, Not Their Politics, supra note 97.
121. Wheeler, supra note 97. Lawyers who rate party endorsements usually have
worked tirelessly for their party. Racial and ethnic considerations also play a role.
Id. See also Nicholson & Weiss, Funding Judicial Campaigns in the Circuit Court of
Cook County, 70 JUDICATURE 17, 18 (June-July 1986). After the 1984 primary
election, it began to look like the Cook County Central Democratic Organization
had lost some of its control. It had endorsed six judges for the circuit court and five
of them had lost. Merit Selection Heats Up, Chicago Tribune, Oct. 13, 1985, § 2, at
18, col. I. But in the 1986 election, Judge McDermott, a friend of Alderman Edward
Vrdolyak (the Cook County Democratic Chairman) was a shoo-in for retention to
the circuit court after being slated by the party in the city election. This was despite
allegations that he was a traffic court fixer. McDermott Election Builds a Case for
Change, Chicago Tribune, Nov. 25, 1986, § 1, at 1, col. 3.
122. Let's Select Judges on Their Merit, Not Their Politics, supra note 97.
123. Information compiled from the Illinois State Bar Association, 16 BENCH
AND BAR 1-3 (May 1986). On occasion judges have been elected who utilized the
petition procedure to have their names put on the ballot. Most noted are Supreme

Court Justices James Dooley and William Clark. Both of those Justices defeated

candidates backed by the Democratic machine in 1976. Lousin, The 1970 Illinois
Constitution: Has It Made a Difference? 8 N. ILL. U.L. REV. 571, 621 (1988).
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merit selection commissions. 124 The purpose of retention elections is
twofold: 1) to "allow the electorate to remove judges who, after a
short period of service, have proved themselves incapable of competent performance on the bench, ' 125 and 2) to ensure an independent
judiciary. The retention process is said to ensure accountability, but
by focusing voter attention on the judge's competence rather than his
or her party label.126
Upon closer inspection, however, it is clear that the retention
method only minimally serves the accountability function. Incumbent
judges are almost never defeated. In the 17 years since the 1970
Constitution went into effect, only 13 judges have not been retained.
Of the 566 judges who sought retention, 553 or 99.980 percent kept
their seats. No supreme or appellate court judge has ever lost a
retention bid. In the 7 elections that were held, the mean affirmative
vote was 74.607.127 This indicates that approximately three out of four
voters voted for retention of a particular judge.
Illinois figures are consistent with the findings of a recent study
which focused on each of the retention elections held in the trial
courts of 10 states for the time period 1964-1984 (Illinois was among
the 10 states). For the 1,864 elections studied, the mean affirmative
vote was 77.201o. Only 22 judges were defeated throughout this period.
Researchers concluded the following: (1) retention elections serve to
insulate judges from popular control; (2) voters do not generally
differentiate much between judges, therefore judges usually suffer
defeat only after a concerted effort is waged against them; (3) judicial
retention elections are characterized by low voter turnout; and (4)
judicial retention elections fail to provide cues to help voters in the
voting booth. Voters generally voted positively as an indication of
128
their trust in the political system.
With regard to the claim that elected judges are accorded more
legitimacy than judges chosen under a merit system, again the claim
appears to be fallacious. A Yankelovich, Skelly and White Polling
Organization 1977 national survey of public and legal professionals'
attitudes toward the courts indicated that public confidence in the
124. Lermack, supra note 103, at 11.

125. P.

DuBoIs,

supra note 87, at 17.

126. Id.
127. Compiled from

ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE ILL. CTS., ANNUAL REPORTS TO THE

1978, 1980, 1982 and 1984); and Illinois
3-4 (Dec. 1986).
128. Hall and Aspin, What Twenty Years of Judicial Retention Elections Have
Told Us, 70 JUDICATURE 340-47 (April-May 1987).

SUPREME COURT OF ILLINOIS (1974, 1976,
State Bar Association, 17 BENCH AND BAR
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courts with regard to efficiency, fairness and responsiveness is unaffected by the type of formal selection system being utilized. Within
each of three areas of comparison, the mean responses of each
category of respondent was remarkably similar across the four types
of judicial system studied. For example, with regard to fairness
(frequency that judges are biased and unfair), the mean figures for
the general public in appointment, merit, partisan and non-partisan
states were 2.7, 2.6, 2.7 and 2.6, respectively. 29
Are women and minority constituencies treated more favorably
due to the use of the election method of selection of judges? Supporters of partisan elections argue that the method is more responsive
to minorities and women, both because judges running for office in
areas with heavily concentrated minority/female populations need
their support and because more minorities and women are likely to
ascend to the bench in these areas.' 30
At first glance there appears to be some support for this argument. Harold Washington, the former Mayor of Chicago, did hold
the key to the ascendancy of a number of judges to the bench during
the 1986 judicial primary election. Several of the candidates he
endorsed won against sitting judges endorsed by the regular Democrats. Further, there is at least a perception that some Democratic
judges ruled in Washington's favor in politically sensitive cases in
order to win the black vote.' 3'
With regard to representation of blacks on the bench, R. Eugene
Pincham, a black appellate judge from the First District, argued in a
recent column in the Chicago Daily Law Bulletin as follows:
In the 35 years I have been a member of the bar, blacks have
increased their numbers on the bench from one to 40 [in
Illinois]. There are now 40 blacks on the bench out of almost
380. Most of us who have been denied the opportunity, we
figure that when the process is about to begin to work for us,
when it has taken us 200 years to teach blacks to exercise their
franchise, when the black community is about to come to
129. Wasmann, Lovrick, & Sheldon, supra note 88, at 173-183.
130. Minority Bar Group Fears Bias in Merit Selection of Judges, Chicago
Tribune, April 22, 1987, § 2, at 2, col. 1; Merit Selection Discriminates Against
Minorities, Women: Pincham, supra note 113.
131. PoliticiansNot Exactly Friendsof the Court as Judges Fightfor Retention,
supra note 103. In the retention election that fall, Washington urged a "no" vote
for Judges Rosin, Salerno, Zimmerman and Grupp. Rosin and Salerno were defeated.
Zimmerman and Grupp just slipped by. Reawakened Voters Rise to Oust 3 Judges,
Chicago Tribune, Nov. 6, 1986, § 2, at 8, col. 4.
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power literally, we perceive this as another means of changing
the process [referring to merit selection] and I don't hold to
it. 132

Pincham's comments, however, have little application outside of
Chicago. In other areas of the state, blacks do not have a sufficient
population base to maintain substantial control over judicial elections.
Women have not been known to vote as a block in judicial
elections. The election method has served as a barrier for them.
Historically, women have always had a more difficult time in
fundraising than men.... And while one would like to think
that money would not determine such elections, campaign
spending in judicial elections, like all other elections, is clearly
a significant factor. . . Beyond that, women judicial candidates face enormous problems overcoming stereotypes; 33the
typical voter does not think a woman looks like a judge.1
We must also question whether we really want a black political
machine controlling our judiciary any more than we want the old
Democratic regulars doing so. Do we want judges ruling a certain
way because of fear of the black electorate anymore than we want
them to rule a certain way because of fear of the white electorate? In
the same campaign in which Mayor Washington wielded so much
political muscle, little green campaign buttons with a white gavel and
the words "Retention Vote No" were distributed by some organizational Democrats. They were designed to intimidate judges on the
bench into siding with the machine in political cases rather than with
Washington. Democratic regulars were particularly interested in ousting Judges Joseph Schneider and Arthur Dunn. Both had decided
hotly contested political cases resulting from partisan battles between
Mayor Washington and Alderman Edward Vrdolyak. Schneider ruled
against Vrdolyak forces by barring a referendum on a proposed nonpartisan mayoral election. Dunn ruled in a key case that gave the
Mayor control over Chicago City Council Committees. Although both
Schneider and Dunn were retained, their approval margins (seventyseven percent and seventy-one percent) were lower than those of
previous contests. Judge Schneider, who previously had been silent
on the question of the selection method of judges emerged as a merit
132. Merit Selection Discriminates Against Minorities, Women: Pincham, Chi.

Daily L. Bull., Oct. 3, 1986, at 36, col. 1.

133. Scott, Women on the Illinois State Court Bench, 74 ILL. B.J. 437-38 (May

1986).
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selection proponent as a result of what he had been through.' 3 4
Further, it remains to be seen what effect Washington's death and
Sawyer's ascendancy to power will have on the black voting block.
Whatever the selection method, prejudice has been and may
continue to be for some time a significant limitation on the number
of blacks and women who become judges. Recent studies have shown,
however, that women and minorities are more likely to make it to the
bench in states where judges are appointed by a chief executive or
under a merit model than in election states. For instance, in a 1985
nationwide study conducted by the Fund for Modern Courts in New
York, it was shown that 17.9% of all judges are women and minorities
in appointment states; 17.2% are women and minorities in merit
selection states; and only 11.1 % are women and minorities in partisan
election states. In Illinois 11.7% of the judges are women and
minorities.'
The Fund for Modern Courts' study was the first
nationwide demographic survey to correlate the gender and race of
judges to the different means through which they were selected. It
demonstrated that, in comparison to merit selection states, Illinois
lags way behind.
In summary, there is no indication that judicial election in Illinois
holds judges any more accountable to the public than another method
might. Nor does it increase the public's perception of the legitimacy
of the court system to have judges elected. In Chicago, the election
method in recent years has given black voters a greater role in judicial
selection than ever before, but this development may or may not
continue and has not filtered down to the rest of the state. Women
have not fared as well, and from looking at the experiences of other
states, women and minorities can be expected to fare better under a
merit selection system.
C.

INDEPENDENCE

Judicial independence refers to "the freedom of the judge from
any external influences which might impair his or her impartiality
toward the opposing litigants and his or her ability to decide each
134. PoliticiansNot Exactly Friendsof the Court As Judges Fight ForRetention,
supra note 103; Reawakened Voters Rise to Oust 3 Judges, supra note 131; Eight
Judges Don't Rate with Bar Group, supra note 101.
135. Stille, Election v. Appointment: Who Wins, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 30, 1985Jan. 6, 1986, at 1, col. 2. See also FUND FOR MODERN COURTS, THE SUCCESS OF
WOMEN AND MINORITIES IN ACHIEVING JUDICIAL OFFICE: THE SELECTION PROCESS

(1985); Tokarz, supra note 105, at 903-51.

62
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case on the merits." ''3 6 An independent judiciary is able to review
cases, construe constitutional provisions and statutes, and develop
common law without fear of requital by the voters or other branches
of government. The principal is firmly ingrained in our legal tradition,
and numerous mechanisms have been adopted in the federal and state
court systems to give it effect. One safeguard of independence is the
grant of immunity to judges so that they cannot be held civilly liable
for decisions they make on the bench. Another is the grant of either
life-time tenure to judges or longer terms of office than other public
officials enjoy. A third is the adoption of a judicial merit selection/
37
retention system. 1
The judicial election method is seen as antithetical to preservation
of judicial independence. Critics of the election method generally
point to two concerns. First, they argue that when a judge secures a
position on the bench due to the organizational and financial assistance of a political party, he or she will find it "almost impossible to
resist completely the importunities of his [or her] creditors for payment
through judicial favors."' 38 When a judge is beholden to particular
individuals or an entire organization, impartial and objective decisionmaking is difficult, if not impossible, to maintain. Second, they point
to the fact that the election method allows judges to be put into office
and then removed from office based on the whims of current majorities. An important aspect of an independent judiciary is its ability to
serve as a check on the excesses of popular majorities, particularly
regarding their interference with the constitutional rights of political
and social minorities. 39 When a judge has to fear an angry electorate,
he or she is not free to decide a particular case on the law alone.
Adoption of a merit selection/retention system is touted as a much
better means of guarding judicial independence.
Illinois' partisan elective selection system, as critics of that method
assert, does work to undermine an independent judiciary. Judicial
candidates have to campaign under a party label and proclaim allegiance to that organization and its set of political goals. To obtain
party support, judicial candidates often have to have been party
workers, they often become involved in reciprocal obligations to
political sponsors and (it has been charged) buy the party's endorsement.
136. P. DUBOlS, supra note 87, at 20.
137. Id. at 27. See also Philipsborn, On the Independence of Judges, 62 ILL.
B.J. 448-50 (April 1974).
138. L. MAYERS, THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 3 (1964).
139. P. DUBOlS, supra note 87, at 26.
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A recent court-appointed commission revealed in part the extent
to which judgeships are awarded to party loyalists. The commission
report noted, for instance, that 50 of 171 full circuit judges in Cook
County are former committeemen, precinct captains, assistant precinct
captains or ward officers. 40 It is well known that party loyalty
influences the slating downstate as well, although a documented study
on this question has not as yet been conducted.
Cook County Circuit Judge Charles E. Freeman's 1986 appointment of his campaign manager to a lucrative trusteeship is just one
of the many examples of how political favors can be repaid. The fees
paid to the trustee were expected to exceed $200,000. Charges were
lodged that the fees were excessive in light of the amount and
complexity of the work he performed, and, as one might expect,
concerns were raised about the propriety of the arrangement in the
4
first place.' 1
Allegations that some judges actually pay for party endorsements
surfaced following a study of judicial candidates' campaign fundraising activities, conducted by Marlene Nicholson and Bradley Weiss
under the auspices of the DePaul College of Law. Nicholson and
Weiss, looking only at 1984 Cook County circuit court elections,
discovered that candidates frequently raised substantial sums of money,
even when they ran unopposed in the primary and faced little or no
opposition in the general election. Their research revealed that almost
all of the money was collected after the deadline for the filing of
petitions of candidacy, so the candidates knew they would not face
any opposition.' 42 Asked why this occurred, Robert Perkins, former
President of the Chicago Council of Lawyers, said, "[it has been
43
widely alleged for years that some of them are buying into slating."
Nicholson and Weiss verified that, of the money raised, sixty-five
percent or more (generally $10,000 per winning candidate) was transferred to either the Democratic Judicial Campaign Committee or the
Democratic Central Committee in Cook County as an expense assess-

140. Study Verdict: Pick Judges By Merit, Chicago Tribune, Oct. 11, 1985, § 2,
at 1, col. 2. Political party activities are distinguished from holding public office
before becoming a judge. As noted in Section III.A. of the text of this article, judges
under election systems are no more likely to have held political office than judges in
merit selection states.
141. Judge Names His Campaign Manager to Trusteeship, Chicago Tribune,
Nov. 23, 1986, § 2, at 1, col. 2.
142. Nicholson & Weiss, supra note 121, at 20, 23-25.
143. Judges Selection By Merit Gets a Boost, Chicago Tribune, Oct. 14, 1985,
§ 2, at 1, col. 5.
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ment. All indications were that the assessment fee greatly exceeded
the actual costs of the donating judge's campaign.1"4
Someone has to supply campaign money to judicial aspirants.
Generally it is lawyers who do so, because they are the only sizable
group that has a real interest in the outcome. Nicholson and Weiss
found that fifty-three percent of the itemized outside contributions
that judges received came from lawyers and law firms.1 45 Obviously
other attorney contributions were also received but were not reported
because they were amounts under $150 and did not have to be
146
itemized.
Lawyers are most often in the best position to evaluate the
integrity and competence of the judicial candidates, and they have a
high stake in ensuring that the most qualified judges are selected. At
the same time, however, attorney contributions create an obvious risk
of undue influence. Judges have numerous opportunities in the course
of litigation to make discretionary decisions that could benefit one
side or the other. Knowledge of the contribution of even a small
amount from one of the lawyers involved in a case could consciously
or unconsciously predispose a judge to favor one litigant over the
other. A supreme court rule was adopted to minimize the possibility
that a conflict will arise. 147 It requires that campaign contributions be
made to campaign committees rather than to judges individually. In
theory, a judge is not supposed to know who makes the donations.
In practice, however, the concept of anonymous giving has never
really worked. Judges attend fund-raising parties and are often aware
of their major contributors.'4
Lawyers are mindful of this when they make contributions to
judges' campaign committees. Therefore, they tend to give more
heavily to the campaigns of sitting judges. 49 An expose by the Chicago
144. Nicholson & Weiss, supra note 121, at 20, 23-25. Advertising was the chief
expense. It averaged $1,508 per judge for both the primary and general elections. Id.
at 24.
145. Id. at 21-22. Candidates or their families often make loans from personal
funds to the campaign or simply donate personal funds without an expectation of
repayment. Id. at 18-20. Seventeen percent of the contributions came from corporate
donors, 2.4076 from unions and 3107o from non-attorney individuals. Id. at 22-23.
146. Candidates for elective offices in Illinois are required by law to fill out a
campaign disclosure statement if they accept or spend $1,000 or more on their
campaigns. They are also required to disclose the names and addresses of contributors
of $150 or more. ILL. REV. STAT., ch. 46, para. 9-11(4), 9-13(13) (1985).
147. S. Ct. R. 67, to be codified as ILL. REV. STAT., ch. IIOA, para. 67 (1987).

148. Reform of Judicial Campaign Urged, Chicago Tribune, May 14, 1987, §

2, at 1, col. 2.
149. Nicholson & Weiss, supra note 121, at 22.
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Tribune revealed that 11 judges on the ballot in Cook County in
November of 1984 had accepted campaign contributions from lawyers
who had cases before them during the year. Five of the judges received
contributions from lawyers whose cases were pending at the time the
contributions were made. 50 A current Illinois Supreme Court Justice
came under fire the following year when he received $59,000 in
contributions from Illinois lawyers after the election was over. The
money was raised to retire his campaign debt which was said to total
$110,000. At least one of the attorney donors had a case pending
before the Illinois Supreme Court at the time of the contribution. 5 '
More recently, charges of improper conduct were lodged against five
Illinois Supreme Court justices for presiding over the disciplinary
cases of six prominent Chicago lawyers, each of whom had donated
thousands of dollars to the justices' election coffers. Three of the
judges indicated that they had no idea of who contributed to their
campaigns and therefore no conflict existed. Each of the lawyers also
denied impropriety. 5 2 Even though such practices are common, legal
and do not violate any ethical rules, they are a real basis for concern.
There also can be no doubt that contributions by lawyers to
judicial campaigns can result in Greylord type entanglements. Some
Greylord judges granted favors to attorneys in cases for as little as
$50.11 Others extorted money from lawyers in the guise of securing
54
loans to repay campaign debts.
Recently, the Illinois State Bar Association proposed a ban on
political donations from attorneys to judges. One alternative it proposed would be for a state checkoff system to be adopted which
would allow taxpayers to designate $1 of their income tax payments
to fund judicial elections.' Thus far, the proposal has received little
support. Anything short of replacing the lawyer funding base with
some other reliable source may force the judges into an even closer
relationship with the political parties.
Rather than tinker with campaign financing rules, it appears as
if a major overhaul of the selection/retention system is really what is
150. Study Verdict: Pick Judges By Merit, supra note 140.
151. Lawyers Refill Justice's Coffers, Chicago Tribune, Aug. 6, 1985, § 2, at 3,
col. 4.
152. Report: Five Justices May Be Guilty of Misconduct, STATE J. REG., Jan.
10, 1988, at 5.
153. After California, What's Next for Judicial Elections, 70 JUDICATURE 360
(April-May 1987).
154. The Holzer Conviction, Chicago Tribune, Feb. 20, 1986, § 1, at 26, col. 2.
155. Obstacles Seen to Reform of Judicial Campaigns, Chicago Tribune, May
19, 1987, § 2, at 3, col. 1.
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needed. Even the retention elections, discussed earlier, which have
gone a long way toward freeing incumbent judges from being beholden
to political sponsors and insulating them from a sometimes intolerant
and retaliatory public, are not providing judges with the independence
that was anticipated. Former Chief Justice of the Illinois Supreme
Court, William Clark, after running for retention in 1986, said that
the election had taught him some valuable lessons:
I learned that judges who are running for retention are called
upon by those who think the judges owe them a certain loyalty
. . . That creates an unfortunate situation of the appearance
of impropriety ... The state legislature must take the opportunity to come up with a system that will eliminate the
possibility of judges owing anything to anyone but the resi15 6
dents of the state as a whole.
Further, competent and deserving judges have sometimes become
the object of vile, negative, ouster campaigns. Most often they have
been able to retain their offices. Of the 13 judges who have not been
retained, all but four have either received less than qualified ratings
by the bar associations or been accused of unethical or illegal practices. 57 Yet, the ouster of even one qualified judge for reasons other
156. Group Begins Big Push for Merit Selection, Chi. Daily L. Bull., Feb. 10,
1987, at 1, col. 3.
157. The following is a list of the judges who have not been retained. Information
is included as to the circuit where they served, the year of the retention election, and
the reason given for their ouster.
1. Judge David Lefkovitz (Cook Co. Cir. 1976) (rated clearly unqualified by
the Chicago Tribune and opposed by the Chicago Bar Association).
2. Judge Joseph Power (Cook Co. Cir. 1976) (accused of political favoritism
during special grand jury investigation of 1969 police raid on Chicago Black Panther
headquarters).
3. Judge William Ginos, Jr. (4th Cir. 1978) (accused of ethics violations for
providing legal advice to jail inmates who later had cases before him).
4. Judge Albert Pucci (10th Cir. 1978) (he was 68 years old and had been ill
and off the bench much of the time).
5. Judge Charles Iben (10th Cir. 1978) (accused of insensitivity, incompetence,
arrogance, lack of judicial temperament and of being too soft on criminal defendants).
6. Judge John Boyle (Cook Co. Cir. 1978) (opposed by the Chicago Council
of Lawyers because of abuse of his chief judge's assignment powers in the handling
of politically sensitive cases).
7. Judge John DeLaurenti (3rd Cir. 1980) (subject of negative press campaign.
Allegations that he was "soft" on criminals were made. He was rated as qualified
by the Illinois State Bar Association and the Tri-City Bar Association, and he received
the endorsements of area law enforcement officials and a broad based coalition of
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than his or her capabilities is unfortunate and unnecessary. The
possibility that a smear campaign can be mobilized against a judge
may create needless tensions and stress for even the most principled,
conscientious and strong-willed of judges. As one legal writer put it

[clourage and independence of judges are imperatives in a free

society because judges have to decide and they have to decide
promptly. Since they are human beings, they have to be free
to be wrong, to make mistakes, to commit error. That is why
we have courts of review. If judges must decide cases and
controversies under the dread of harassment or removal from
office for undefined and unforeseeable mistakes, then Orwell's
"1984" will not be 10 years away; it will be just around the

corner."5 8

The merit selection processes in use in other states do not serve
perfectly the value of judicial independence. Most obvious is the
area lawyers).
8. Judge Victor Mosele (3rd Cir. 1980) (subject of the same negative campaign
as Judge DeLaurenti and the same allegations were made against him. He also was
rated as qualified by the respective bar associations, the law enforcement community,
and many area lawyers).
9. Judge David Babb (17th Cir. 1980) (given a "not recommended" rating by
the Illinois State Bar Association. Target of a citizens' organized campaign because
he had sentenced the father of a child abuse victim to probation and a fine. The
four month old boy had been left deaf, blind and brain damaged as a result of the
beating).
10. Judge Jose Vaszues (Cook Co. Cir. 1982) (subject of an investigation by
the Illinois Judicial Inquiry Board for allegedly directing defendants in his courtroom
to hire a private attorney he had chosen. He was also criticized by State's Attorney
Daley for not allowing juveniles charged with violent crimes to be tried as adults.).
11. Judge Lawrence Passerella (Cook Co. Cir. 1986) (ousted for acquitting a
man of beating up a female police officer).
12. Judge Allen Rosin (Cook Co. Cir. 1986) (opposed by the bar associations
because of Greylord charges).
13. Judge Frank Salerno (Cook Co. Cir. 1986) (opposed by the bar associations
because of Greylord charges).
See Lermack, supra note 103, at 12-13; Reawakened Voters Rise to Oust 3
Judges, supra note 119; Eight Judges Don't Rate With Bar Groups, supra note 101.
Reform of Judicial Campaign Urged, Chicago Tribune, May 14, 1987, § 2, at 1,col.
2; Nicholson § Weiss, supra note 121, at 22; Voters Oust Boone County Judge,
Chicago Tribune, Nov. 6, 1980, § 1, at 13, col. 1; Vasquez May Lose Judgeship,
Chicago Tribune, Nov. 4, 1982, § 1, at 17, col. 1; Voters Oust Two Circuit Court
Judges, Alton Telegraph, Nov. 5, 1980, at 1; Question of Ethics for William A.
Ginos, Jr., Hillsboro Journal, Nov. 7, 1978, at 1.
158. Doherty, Judges Are Not Second-Class Citizens, 62 ILL. B.J. 274, 278 (Jan.
1974).
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threat posed by executive control of the selection phase. Research has
shown that governors use judicial appointments as rewards and have
no inhibition about attempting to get their political supporters nominated. Appointed judges are most often of the political party of the
executive that appointed them. 5 9 The problem is compounded when
a governor appoints both nominating commission members and judicial candidates. In Illinois, it could be exacerbated even more
because there is no constitutional limitation on the number of terms
that a governor can serve. The inclusion of certain provisions in the
merit selection model could, however, reduce dominance by the
governor. Politicking might still occur, but its nature and impact
would be of a significantly different character.
To minimize the possibility that candidates will become beholden
to the governor or the governor's political party, nominating commission members can be chosen on a bipartisan basis by persons other
then the governor. Current proposals call for majority and minority
leaders of the legislature to appoint all lay members. Others would
divide the responsibility among the highest ranking constitutionally
elected officers of different parties.
Provisions that the governor make his choice from among three
qualified nominees given to him by the bipartisan commission should
foster choices based on merit rather than political party identity. As
another means of controlling the partisan nature of the appointment,
the plan can call for nominee names to go forward only when a threefifths vote of the commission members can be achieved. Restricting
nominating commission members to fixed terms and preventing them
from succeeding themselves will also help protect independence in the
selection process.
Studies of merit states have shown that politics can pervade the
pre-selection process in two other ways. First, there is often competition among various groups for representation on the nominating
commissions. For example, rival bar associations reflecting distinct
status groups and socio-economic and political interests often campaign for the election of their members. This type of politicking,
however, provides an indirect form of accountability and does not
undermine judicial independence. Competing bar group members are
generally elected in almost equal numbers, and their perspectives on
judicial selection are shaped to a great degree by the kinds of clients
0
they serve. 16
159. Tokarz, supra note 105, at 941-946.

160. Watson, Downing, & Spiegel, Bar Politics, Judicial Selection and the

Representation of Social Interest, 61 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 54-71 (1967).
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A second method of politicking often occurs when competing
judicial aspirants, or others on their behalf, lobby commission members. This problem can be anticipated and may be minimized or even
eliminated by the following: (1) articulated standards for evaluating
judicial candidates which emphasize merit and competence; (2) education and training for commission members to enhance their expertise
in interviewing and assessing the candidates; (3) uniform interviewing,
screening and voting procedures; (4) bans on commissioners receiving
communications directly or indirectly from the governor and others;
and (5) a requirement that commissioners record all written and oral

communications with outsiders161

The post-selection stage is more problematic. Retention elections,
generally considered to be a critical element of a merit selection
model, have actually worked to keep almost all incumbents in office.
In contrast to elected judges, judges selected under a merit plan are
much less beholden to the interests of political parties and others, and
they also do not have to repay nominating commission members or
the appointing authority for their continued appointment. In theory,
once they are in office, they are accountable only to the electorate
via the retention process.
As has been demonstrated in Illinois, retention elections have not
insulated judges from smear campaigns and intentional harassment
1 62
and intimidation by political parties and other interest groups.
Protection from the kinds of abuses seen in the Passarella, Schneider
and Dunn retention bids can only be achieved through adoption of
review commission provisions of the kind proposed by the Task Force,
Dunn, Netsch, Ronan and Farley models. Under each of these proposals, only judges whose performance is found to be unacceptable
by separately constituted, fixed-term review commissions would have
to campaign for retention. 63 Qualified judges would be reappointed
after periodic review, and judges found to be wanting by commission
standards could appeal to the voters to remain in office.
V.

CoN~cLusioN

The 1964 and 1970 reforms of the judicial article of the Illinois
Constitution did not go far enough. Left in place was an outdated,
unworkable and at times corrupt partisan judicial election system.
Dissatisfaction with the election of judges has continued to surface
161. Tokarz, supra note 105, at 946-50.
162. See supra text accompanying notes 118-19, 131-34, 157.
163. See supra text accompanying note 83.
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year after year. The Greylord investigation only served to fuel the fire
for change to a merit selection method. In the past, merit selection
proponents have pursued two different avenues for change. However,
they have not succeeded either in setting up a merit system for filling

vacancies or putting a constitutional amendment to the voters. Now,

while continuing to pursue these means, a third avenue is available to
them by calling for a constitutional convention.
The chief reason the politicians have opposed merit selection is
that it would diminish their power over the composition of the state's

courts. Concerns from minority groups and women that the appointive
procedure would leave them out, as well as the divisiveness of
proponents for merit selection, have also helped sink merit selection

proposals in the past. 16 Current plans, however, have a better chance
for success.

The Cook County Regular Democratic Organization's power-over
the selection of judges has increasingly eroded. Some regulars and
long-time opponents of merit selection, such as Representative Al

Ronan, have even joined the ranks of the appointment proponents.

Also, a number of the merit plans incorporate the local option feature

164. How to Get Merit Selection Enacted, Chicago Tribune, Feb. 13, 1987, § 1,
at 18, col. 1.
It is interesting that the Illinois Supreme Court has failed to establish a merit
system for the filling of vacancies, even though a majority of the justices have stated
they favor merit selection. Currently the Supreme Court fills vacancies itself, allocating appointments among its members. It has authority to develop any process that it
chooses when making appointments. The Chicago Council of Lawyers and Chicago
Tribune editorial staff asked last year that the court exercise leadership and adopt a
merit selection method. Lawyers Urge Merit Selection, Chicago Tribune, Sept. 11,
1987, § 2, at 3, col. 1; An Opportunity for Judicial Leadership, Chicago Tribune,
Sept. 15, 1987, § 1, at 14, col. 1.
With the recent resignation of Justice Seymour Simon, the issue has really heated
up. The Chicago Bar Association and a group called the Cook County Court Watchers
have joined the fray specifically requesting the Illinois Supreme Court to use merit
selection in filling that vacancy and others that arise in the appellate and circuit
courts. In its petition, the Chicago Bar Association even asked that the nominating
commissions be representative of the populations (e.g. by race and sex) in each
judicial district or circuit. Since the Supreme Court already altered its appointment
process by using a formal application process for the first time in the history of the
court, it is unlikely that the courts will be responsive to this recent pressure. The
court may, however, pay attention to the resolution of the Cook County Bar
Association calling for the appointment of a black. Illinois has never had a black or
a woman on its highest court. High Court Should Make Appointments, STATE J.
REG., January 29, 1988, at 6, col. 1; Fill Vacancy with Black, State Supreme Court
Urged, STATE J. REc., Feb. 7, 1987, at 6, col. I.
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for the first time. The local option should appeal to downstate and
suburban lawmakers who favor the current system
Whether minority/female representation under a merit appointment model is, in reality, a problem is debatable. However, the fact
that there is opposition to merit selection, particularly by black lawyers
and politicians, is not debatable. To allay the fears of minorities and
women, some of the proposals have incorporated equal opportunity
language. For example, the Task Force plan specifies that, in regard
to commission nominations to the governor, the following language
would control:
"recommended for appointment" means persons who by their
character, background, temperament, professional aptitude,
experience and commitment to equal justice under the law are
deemed by the Commission to be best qualified to fill the
vacancy. All such persons shall have the right to be considered
for selection by a Judicial Nominating Commission free from
discrimination on the basis of race, color, creed, national
65
ancestry or sex.
Still, it is doubtful that unenforceable, broad, equal opportunity
language of the kind offered in these plans will appease minority and
women's concerns.
Karen Tokarz, in a recent article on women judges under the
Missouri merit plan, observed that women are often excluded from
the nomination and appointment process. Missouri has never had a
woman governor and no woman has ever participated in the appointment of judges or the selection of lay members to the nominating
commissions. No woman lawyers have ever been elected to any of the
nominating commissions either. To increase the likelihood that women
and minorities are appointed as judges, she recommended that merit
plans contain provisions to ensure that nominating commissions in66
clude female and minorities members.1
Ronan's "pilot" merit selection model also might help. It allows
merit selection to be tried in the circuit courts and then either retracted
five years later by the General Assembly or extended to the higher
courts. If it turns out that the merit system has not been responsive
to women and minorities, legislators could throw the system out or
alternatives could be explored before it is extended to the appellate
and supreme courts.
165. Task Force on Judicial Merit Selection, supra note 61, at § 12.1(d).
166. Tokarz, supra note 105, at 937, 948.
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Bickering among proponents about which system comes the
closest to perfection is a real concern. The Illinois State Bar Association is solidly behind the Dunn plan at present. 167 The Ronan model
has received the praise of Frances Zemans of Project Merit Selection
of Judges. 68 The Chicago Bar Association is squarely behind Farley's
resolution.' 69 Netsch's plan has the backing of Cook County State's
Attorney Richard Daley, U.S. Attorney Dan Webb, Senator Bob
Kustra (R. Des Plaines) and Representative John Dunn (D. Decatur)
who is himself the lead sponsor of House Joint Resolution 20. 170
Even the Governor's Task Force, set up especially for the purpose
of bringing the proponents together, has run into difficulty gaining
acceptance for its plan. House Speaker Michael Madigan (D. Chicago)
has indicated he will oppose any proposal giving power to the governor
to appoint judges. Democrats maintain a 67-51 majority in the
House. 171 Senator Dawn Clark Netsch (D. Chicago), a long-time
supporter of merit selection and co-sponsor of another merit bill,
although agreeing in substance with the Task Force proposal, believes
it is doomed to fail since it does not contain a local option provision.
She pointed out that although she prefers implementation of a merit
method statewide, "crass political realities" dictate otherwise. According to her, since downstate voters view the election of judges as
a Cook County problem, downstate support for any merit plan will
depend on this option.72
With seven different proposals pending, compromises are obviously going to have to be struck. It will be worth the effort. Although
there is no definitive evidence that judges selected under a merit
method are more qualified than elected judges, we do know that the
election/retention method does not make judges as accountable to the
public as its proponents like to argue. Accountability is more likely
167. ISBA Approves New Merit Selection Plan, supra note 5. (on March 4,
1988, the I.S.B.A. Board of Governors voted also to support the Governor's Task
Force bill. In previous legislative sessions, the I.S.B.A. has taken the position that it
would not stand in the way of worthy competing selection models).
168. Bill to Seek Merit Selection, Chicago Tribune, Mar. 3, 1987, § 2, at 1, col.
15.
169. Chicago Bar Offers Merit Selection Plan, Chicago Tribune, Oct. 25, 1985,
§ 2, at 3, col. 1.
170. Selection of Judges by Merit Proposed, Chicago Tribune, Mar. 23, 1985,
§ 1, at 6, col. 1.
171. Selection of Judges On Merit Gets Boost, Chicago Tribune, Mar. 4, 1987,
§ 2, at 2, col. 5.
172. Merit Selection of Judges Putting State Task Force to the Test, Chicago
Tribune, June 16, 1987, § 2, at 8, col. 1.
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to be to party sponsors and campaign contributors. We also know
that judicial independence is sacrificed under Such a system. Although
the merit selection process is not without flaws, a carefully structured
model could further quality selections, provide for indirect accountability and guarantee judicial independence. To achieve these goals,
several features of a merit model cannot afford to be compromised.
Chief among them are provisions calling for politically balanced and
representative nominating and review commissions. To ensure that
women and minorities are included in commission membership, a
provision in the plan might specify that commissioners "shall reasonably reflect the diversity of the populations in each judicial district
and circuit."1 73 Alternatively, it could require that a minimum number
of the members be minorities and women.
Eleven member commissions seem reasonable. The Task Force
proposal which calls for 15 members in Cook County and 11 on
downstate commissions is too convoluted. Six members should be lay
persons and five lawyers. Judges should not serve as members. To
ensure that the people maintain as much control over the process as
possible, lay members should be in the majority. They can also help
prevent bar politics from dominating the process and add a consumer
perspective. Lawyer membership is needed because lawyers are in the
best position to evaluate the applicants' background and suitability
for judicial service. Past research indicates that when judges serve on
nominating commissions, they wield the most influence. Lawyer members frequently are unwilling to go against the advice or advocacy of
judges, particularly when they may have to appear before them in
court. Lay members are often in awe of judge commissioners. 74
Although judges can provide insight concerning the workings of the
court, there is greater value in ensuring that commission members are
free to pursue their own viewpoints.
Subject to the restrictions mentioned earlier, the appointing authority should be the governor. If the supreme court were the appointing body, it would unduly politicize the court and run counter to the
value of judicial independence. Further, there is a need for the
appointing official to obtain varied opinions concerning the problems
173. The Chicago Bar Association recommended such language in a proposal it
made to the supreme court for the filling of the current vacancy on the supreme
court by use of a merit plan. High Court Should Make Appointments, STATE J.
REG., Jan. 29, 1988, at 6.
174. ILLINOIS STATE BAR ASSOCIATION, INITIAL REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON JUDICIAL MERIT SELECTION TO THE ILLINOIS STATE BAR ASSOCIATION BOARD

OF GOVERNORS

22 (1981); Tokarz, supra note 105, at 938.
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of the courts and the needs for representation on the bench of various
segments of the communities. Judges have no traditional or convenient
means of engaging in a dialogue with the community or the press.
The governor would be in a good position to entertain this discussion.
The current retention system needs to be reworked. Proposed
judicial review commissions, coupled with retention elections, are
deserving of a try. The goal should be to require merit selection of
all Illinois judges, even if political realities may dictate turning to
local options and/or the adoption of an evolutionary process. Any
proposal which is passed should allow for expansion of merit selection
to other courts and to other locations within the state without further
constitutional reform.

